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Summary: This is a Foresight paper prepared for the EU-funded research project,
Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development, FESSUD. Drawing on
lessons from the provision of water in England, the paper anticipates future developments
in the provision of health, exploring the increasing role of finance and financial cultures.
This is captured in the term “financialisation” which has recently emerged in academic
literature to account for the rapid expansion of financial assets and financial activity in the
economy, and the expanding reach of the financial sector into traditionally non-financial
areas of economic and social life.
The paper starts with an overview of the context in which financialisation has evolved
within, and impacted upon, the National Health Service (NHS). Two contextual elements
stand out. First, since the 1980s, the NHS has been subject to incremental reforms to
introduce market-mimetic structures. These reforms accelerated with the introduction of
the 2012 Health and Social Care Act (HSCA). This legislation has only just begun to have an
impact at the time of writing (December 2015), but the extent of private sector involvement
in health provision is likely to increase rapidly as a result of the Act. The second significant
aspect of the context for financialisation is the growing financial deficit in the NHS which
creates an important backdrop to the HSCA reforms. Irrespective of the proximate as well
as the deeper reasons for this, it provides for a narrative of “unaffordability” and
“inefficiency”, itself taken as a rationale both for greater private sector intervention and as
justification for NHS trusts to increase revenue from private sources. However, the paper
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shows that this narrative thread does not fit with global data which indicate that the NHS is
broadly in line with OECD averages for spending on GDP, and health outcomes.
The paper considers four mechanisms by which financialisation is affecting the health
service in England. First, financing in the sector is allocated on the basis of internal
“markets” which mimic financialised structures (regardless of ownership or provision). An
institutional division between the “purchaser” and “provider” of health services within the
NHS has been refined over the years since it was first introduced in the early 1990s.
Health providers are remunerated via a complex “pricing” system known as Payment by
Results (PBR) so that transactions between state agencies are delineated in financial
terms. Second, financial processes have become embedded in the sector via the process
of tendering to both NHS and private service providers. A growing proportion of services
has been contracted to private companies, particularly in the wake of the 2012 HSCA.
Aside from creeping privatization, this process brings financial practices into the provision
of health services, with, for example, health commissioners required to observe
competition law even where contracts are awarded to state organisations.
Third, under the 2012 HSCA, the cap on the proportion of income that NHS providers can
raise from private patients has increased from 2% to 49%, leading to an increase in private
patient income within some NHS hospitals. Global finance is becoming more closely
integrated with health provision as a result with new partnerships developing between
NHS providers and private investors. Finally, since the early 1990s most new capital
investment in the NHS has been undertaken through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
where the private sector finances the design, build and operation of hospitals and these
are then leased back to the NHS Trust over a period of decades. These contracts have
proven to be costly for NHS hospitals but highly lucrative for (often institutional financial
sector) investors in PFI contracts.
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The paper then considers the nature of the private companies that are involved in
healthcare. Health providers are often owned by larger conglomerates for which health is
one of many assets in a diverse investment portfolio. The paper compares the changes
taking place in health with developments in the water sector in England which has been
privatized since 1989 and where financial structures, processes motives and investors
have long been established. In both sectors, processes associated with financialisation
mean that services are increasingly distanced from the materiality of provision and
instead are interpreted in terms of the revenue stream that they can provide to investors.
Innovative financial practices have been adopted to boost shareholder returns.
In terms of Foresight, health provision is in the process of a fundamental transition from a
public service to a financial asset, as has happened in the provision of water in England.
The result is expected to be a considerable deepening in the cultures of individualisation
and commodification of the health system. This is likely to be associated with a
fragmented service and greater inequality in a number of respects: government spending
on health will be transferred ultimately to global private finance, boosting the earnings of
financial investors; the state will be left with the most difficult (and expensive) to treat as
these are of least interest to the private sector; a two-tier system will emerge, with the
poorest left with a severely weakened second-rate health system; labour rights are
expected to be weakened as employment structures become fragmented across different
health providers.
Such developments threaten to undermine the core principles on which the NHS was
founded. Furthermore, these changes will be difficult to reverse as the ability of the public
sector to pose an effective alternative to private and financialised provision of health will
be considerably debilitated.
Key words: Health privatisation, NHS, financialisation
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1 Introduction
This paper is one of a collection of Foresight papers prepared for the EU-funded research
project, Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development, FESSUD. This
paper draws on lessons from an earlier FESSUD case study on the financialisation of
water (Bayliss 2014) to anticipate future developments in the National Health Service
(NHS) in England. The paper shows that profound changes are taking place in the
provision of health, as financial cultures are becoming increasingly embedded in the
sector. In part this is through privatisation with a growing proportion of health services
contracted to private investors, including through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), with
private health providers often backed by institutional financial investors. But this paper
shows that the transitions in the health sector go beyond simple privatisation, with finance
now dominating interfaces even between state agents. Furthermore the backdrop of a
growing financial deficit in hospital trusts has focused attention on financial performance
and legitimises increasing penetration of the private sector in the health system. In
common with the provision of water, health services are becoming transformed into
financial assets to form part of global investment portfolios of private investors.
The paper draws on the Systems of Provision (SoP) approach adopted in the water paper
and applied in a series of case studies on the financialisation of water and housing for
Work Package 8 (WP8) of FESSUD. This approach considers that sector outcomes are
deemed to emerge from relations between agents which are themselves embedded in
historically-evolved social and economic structures and processes. The SoP also derives
from the material properties and cultural associations attached to specific goods and
services. A key principle of the SoP approach is that consumption is not the spontaneous
outcome of decisions made by rational individuals but is inherently linked to the
production process. Agents have different, and often competing, interests. Outcomes, and
how they are achieved, are highly contested. Contestation among agents leads to
continually evolving outcomes which result from the interplay of various factors including
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vested interests, bargaining positions and government policy, all of which are embedded in
a specific context. Contestation can take the form of formal negotiation, for example, in
the rounds of the price-setting process between the regulator and water companies.
However, much of the contested space lies outside the realms of the formal regulatory
framework. For the SoP approach, what is not regulated might be as important as what is.
Furthermore, the regulatory machinery does not just set the rules for the firms involved in
the delivery of water or health or housing, but also shapes the ethos of the sector which
impacts on all stakeholders. For more information on the SoP approach, see Bayliss, Fine
and Robertson (2013).
This paper broadens the scope of the SoP approach to consider the financialisation of the
health sector. The aim is to provide an overview of different elements of financing and
financialisation to show how they integrate in the health system and to identify the agents
involved in provision. One reason for doing this is that the SoP approach developed in WP8
is based in part on the idea that sector outcomes are highly context specific and expanding
the sector coverage can allow the significance of context to be explored in more depth. A
second reason for following this approach is that these sectors are at different stages in
privatisation and financialisation, both of which are well established in water but less so in
health. Experiences from other sectors may be instructive in terms of foresight. While the
essence of the SoP approach is that the system in its entirety needs to be reviewed to
understand the way in which agents interact to reach outcomes, some aspects of health
provision, for example, primary care, have been omitted in this paper to make the task
manageable.
This paper adopts a broad interpretation of financialisation, in line with that proposed by
Epstein (2005, p. 3) as “the increasing role of financial motives, markets, actors and
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”.1 Recent
1 In our work for WP8, we developed a more precise definition of financialisation (see Deliverable D8.27),
making the distinction between commodification of production, commodity form where payments are made
on a periodic basis (although not necessarily attached to profit oriented activity, such as a nominal payment
for a service) and commodity calculation where financial calculation is made but monetary exchange does
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changes in internal structures in health provision as well as new legislation have brought
in a more finance-oriented ethos, and privatisation is expected to expand greatly in the
future. As such, then, the Epstein definition is appropriate here as the sector shows a
clear shift towards greater financial pressures and narratives, but largely within a state-
owned framework of provision at this stage. However, this varies and some areas of
healthcare have had more financialisation activity than others, as the paper demonstrates.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the main findings from the
case study into the SoP for water in England and Wales in summary form by way of brief
background. This is followed by an outline of the history and key issues that frame the
context for the health SoP in England. As mentioned above, there are different facets to
financialisation and the nature and impact vary according to the location within the SoP.
Section 4 presents four core mechanisms by which financialisation is having an impact on
the health service: internal “markets” create financialised structures (regardless of
ownership); outsourcing and subcontracting of NHS-funded services to non-NHS (mainly
private) service providers; private patient income for NHS providers; and the private
finance initiative (PFI). Each of these has contributed to increasing financialisation
although the incidence and impact on processes and outcomes are diverse. This is
followed by a section on the private companies that are involved in healthcare with
particular emphasis on the role of those owned by private financial sector investors. The
final section concludes with a comparison of health and water provision and draws some
conclusions for foresight.
2 Water in England and Wales
The SoP for water in England and Wales was the subject of a detailed case study for
FESSUD (Bayliss 2014). There was a great deal learned from this study and too much to be
not necessarily take place (see Bayliss, Fine and Robertson 2015). In due course, there may be scope to
apply this framing to developments in the health sector but, at this stage, with a focus on foresight and
general trends in the sector, a broader definition suffices.
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repeated here but some of the salient points that are relevant to the provision of health
are outlined below:
 The sector has evolved considerably since it was privatised by listing on the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1989. Initially owned by dispersed shareholders, including
water company customers, now the majority of firms have been de-listed and, since
the mid-2000s, there has been greater entry of private financial owners in the
sector. Four out of the ten water and sewerage companies (WASCs) are now owned
by special purpose vehicles (SPVs) set up by financial investors, mostly in offshore
locations.
 The material features of water have shaped the way that finance has impacted on
the sector. Water is largely homogenous. Bills are paid regularly, demand is stable,
technology does not change rapidly and this means that the associated revenues
are predictable far into the future. This has created a source of funds which can be
securitised with the cash flow from future water bills packaged and sold as
financial assets.
 The context of England and Wales has also proved to be conducive to
financialisation. The sector regulator, Ofwat, is required to ensure that firms are
able to finance their operations. The Government has stated its commitment to
increasing private financing for infrastructure, and places considerable importance
on an attractive regulatory environment for investors. The regulatory structure has
been stable and predictable for the past fifteen years and prices have allowed
generous returns for shareholders although, in 2015, tighter price controls were
imposed on private water companies.
 The nature and extent of financialisation varies according to ownership structure.
Four water and sewerage companies owned by private financial investors have
carried out a specific kind of financial process known as Whole Business
Securitisation (WBS) which has enabled them to develop highly leveraged corporate
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structures. The debts accrued are used in part to finance investment but are also
used to buy the companies themselves and to pay dividends. High debts (in some
cases owed to group companies) are financed with interest payments that are tax
deductible. These water companies keep their tax liabilities low and financing costs
are passed on to consumers.
 The sector regulator, Ofwat, sets prices and monitors firms’ performance. However
regulatory interventions are not neutral and decisions are contested, although
contestation is largely between the regulator and water companies with little
involvement from consumers or labour. The regulator intervenes selectively, for
example, setting and monitoring targets for customer services while stepping back
from intervening in highly leveraged corporate structures or high payments of
interest and dividends.
This then provides a brief outline of the SoP for water in England and Wales. There is far
more detail in the case study paper but these are the significant issues that have
resonance with the SoP for health discussed in the rest of this paper.
3 The health system in England
The National Health Service (NHS) was set up in 1948 bringing all medical services
together (hospitals, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, opticians and dentists) in one umbrella
organisation to provide services that are free for all at the point of delivery.2 There were
three central principles:
 That it meets the needs of everyone
 That it be free at the point of delivery
2 Some charges were introduced soon after the NHS was established. A prescription charge of one shilling
(5p) and a flat rate of £1 for ordinary dental treatment were brought in on 1 June 1952, although prescription
charges were abolished in 1965 but reintroduced in 1968
http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/nhshistory/Pages/NHShistory1948.aspx [accessed 23 December
2015]
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 That it be based on clinical need and not ability to pay.
This has since been expanded to cover seven principles as set out in the 2011 NHS
Constitution (NHS 2015).
1. The NHS provides a comprehensive service available to all;
2. Access to NHS services is based on clinical need not an individual’s ability to pay;
3. The NHS aspires to the highest standards of excellence and professionalism;
4. The patient will be at the heart of everything the NHS does;
5. The NHS works across organisational boundaries and in partnership with other
organisation in the interests of patients, local communities and the wider population;
6. The NHS is committed to providing best value for taxpayers’ money and the most
effective fair and sustainable use of finite resources;
7. The NHS is accountable to the public, communities and patients that it serves.
The NHS accounts for the vast majority of healthcare spending in the UK. Private spending
on health in 2012 made up only about 16% of total UK health spending.3 Together with
2010 this was the lowest proportion since records began in 1997. Private spending
increased steadily by 5.1% a year in the decade before the 2008 downturn but fell by an
average of 2.8% a year in real terms between 2008 and 2012, affected by the financial
crisis (Charlesworth 2015; Lloyd 2015). The majority of those with private health cover
receive it as an employee benefit. In the 2000s, private firms saw a fall in demand for
privately-funded treatment and an increase in demand from the NHS to deliver the same
operations (Arora et al 2013).
For around forty years after it was established, the operation of the NHS continued
relatively unchanged but since 1991, the NHS has been subject to what has been termed
an “unrelenting sequence of reorganisations, all attempting to recalibrate the internal
3 This includes goods such as over-the-counter pharmaceuticals and services such as dental and private
hospital services.
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market” (NEF 2014, p.9). The most recent reform came with the 2012 Health and Social
Care Act (HSCA), which introduced some dramatic changes, particularly in the reach of the
private sector. Before the 2012 HSCA, an internal market was already in existence in
health provision (discussed below) with a division between purchasers and providers of
healthcare. However, until 2013, the providers of care were almost all part of the public
NHS (hospital or community NHS trusts). Under the terms of the HSCA, the
“commissioners” of healthcare, responsible for around 60% of the NHS budget, are now
required to allocate funds by means of a competitive tender with all providers, including
for-profit health companies as well as NHS providers, all treated equally with “any
qualified provider” entitled to bid (unless there is justification for not doing so).
The sector regulator, Monitor, was also established under the HSCA 2012 (p.91). Under
Section 62:
“(1) The main duty of Monitor is to protect and promote the interests of people who
use health care services by promoting provision of a health care service which:
(a) is economic, efficient and effective, and
(b) maintains or improves the quality of the services”.
Clearly, the mandate of Monitor is fairly broad. There is also a requirement to ensure that
competition rules are observed. This brings health provision into closer contact with
financial practices. In the short time since it was established in 2012, Monitor has evolved
considerably. Initially set up with fewer than 50 employees, there has since been an
increase in staff to more than 350. Recruitment has added economists, accountants,
communication specialists, policy experts and competition lawyers.4
The vision associated with the HSCA is of a regulated health service like those that have
been established with the privatised utilities in England. The NEF (2014, p.5) quotes David
Bennett, Chief Executive of the regulator, Monitor:
4 “Getting to grips with Monitor’s framework for change” Health Service Journal, 20 July 2015.
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We, in the UK, have done this in other sectors before. We did it in gas, we did it in
power, we did it in telecoms [...] We’ve done it in rail, we’ve done it in water, so there’s
actually 20 years of experience in taking monopolistic, monolithic markets and
providers and exposing them to economic regulation.
At the time of writing (December 2015), the NHS is facing a growing financial crisis. The
number of NHS providers (acute and specialist hospitals, community organisations and
mental health trusts) reporting a deficit doubled between 2012/13 and 2013/14. At the end
of the 2014/15 financial year, 131 NHS Trusts reported an underlying financial deficit while
115 delivered an underlying financial surplus. However, the combined total of the deficits
significantly outweighed that of the surpluses so that the net deficit of health providers
came to £842m in March 2015 (DoH 2015). Based on current performance, NHS England’s
Trusts are predicting they will end the 2015/16 financial year with a deficit of £2.2bn.
Figure 1 shows how the financial position has changed since 2010 when Trusts reported a
surplus of nearly £2bn. Deficits are concentrated in the acute (hospital) sector. At the end
of September 2014, 81% of all NHS acute hospitals in England were in deficit
(Charlesworth 2015). There are concerns that all of England’s 156 acute hospital trusts
will be in the red at the end of 2015-16.5
5 “NHS cannot make £22bn cut sought by government, finance chiefs warn” The Guardian, 18 November
2015.
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Figure 1: Net surplus/deficit of NHS providers in England (£bn at 2015/16 prices)
Sources: 2009-2015, Department of Health Annual Accounts, also in The Independent 9 October 2015 “The
financial meltdown of the NHS, in one chart”; predictions 2015-16, The Guardian, 20 November 2015,
“NHS deficit soars to £1.6bn”
In August 2015, the Chief Executive of Monitor sent a letter to all Foundation Trusts (FTs)
in deficit saying that the NHS is “facing an almost unprecedented financial challenge this
year”, adding that no stones must be left unturned in their “collective efforts to make the
money go as far as possible” and this includes reviewing staffing to make sure “only
essential” vacancies are filled.6 Some Trust chief executives have responded that they
cannot improve their financial position without a significant compromise to access
standards, service provision and quality of care.7
Reasons put forward to account for the deficit include:
1. Increasing and ageing population: The number of people aged over 65 is
estimated to increase by 51% between 2010 and 2030 and the number over 85 will
6 “FTs should scrap ‘non-essential’ jobs due to unprecedented financial crisis” National Health Executive 4
August 2015
7 http://www.lgcplus.com/news/no-more-savings-can-be-made-hospitals-tell-regulators/5089955.article
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double over the same period. Conventional wisdom is that this will lead to greater
demands on the health service. However this may just tend to delay the time at
which the health care costs associated with later life are incurred, rather than
increasing those costs per se (Appleby 2013).
2. Increased staff costs: There are two upward pressures on staff costs. In response
to concerns about the quality of care following a scandal at Mid Staffordshire and
subsequent review, new NICE guidance on safe staffing levels were drawn up as
well as a requirement to publish ward staffing levels. In 2011/12 and 2012/13 the
number of nurses employed by the NHS fell, but in 2013/14 the overall number of
nurses increased by 1%, with acute, elderly and general nurses increasing by 2% in
that year alone. In addition to the requirement to increase staffing numbers, the
NHS has struggled to recruit permanent skilled staff (in part due to a pay freeze
imposed to keep costs down). The result has been a large increase in the cost of
temporary staff. Spending on this has grown sharply from £3.6bn in 2012/13
(around 7 percent of all NHS staff costs (Nuffield Trust 2015)) to £4.6bn in 2013/14
(2014/15 prices) – a 28% increase in just one year (Charlesworth 2015).
3. Underfunding of social care: Public spending on social care and personal adult
social services has fallen (Lloyd 2015). Research cited in The Guardian indicates
that some 500,000 people who would have received social care in 2009 no longer
qualify for it, despite an ageing population.8 Nine out of ten General Practitioners
(GPs) are reported to believe that deep cuts to social care under the 2010-2015
coalition government have added to the growing overcrowding at GP surgeries and
hospital A&E units. One knock-on effect of the failings in social care provision has
been an increase in ‘delayed discharges’ meaning that patients spend longer in
hospital than is medically required (Gaughan et al 2014).
8 “’Chronic underfunding’ of social care increases burden on NHS, say GPs” The Guardian 13 March 2015
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4. Inadequate funding: Since it was founded in 1948 government spending on health
across the UK has risen by an average of 3.7% a year in real terms (to 2014) and has
more than doubled as a share of GDP, from 3.6% in 1949/50 to 7.5% in 2013/14
(Charlesworth 2015; Lloyd 2015) but there has been variation in health spending
over the years. The 2001/02 to 2004/05 parliament saw the highest period of
spending growth for the UK NHS at 8.7% a year in real terms (Charlesworth 2015;
Lloyd 2015). This means that in 2010 the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition
government entered power after the longest period of sustained NHS spending
increases in its history. Waiting times were the lowest they had ever been.
International surveys of health systems put the NHS high in the league tables on
many measures and public satisfaction was at its highest ever (Timmins 2012). In
contrast, the coalition government (2010 to 2015) oversaw the lowest rate of growth
in health spending since 1955 at 0.6% per annum (Charlesworth 2015; Lloyd 2015).
While the NHS budget has been increasing by a small amount in real terms over the past
five years, rising demand means that costs need to be cut to maintain the current level of
services. Funding allocations to health providers are based on trusts improving efficiency.
Many spending cuts have already been made and it is increasingly difficult to cut further.
Hospital trusts managed to withstand financial pressures, at first using traditional
measures (pay freezes, cuts in management costs, reductions in tariffs for some services)
but the strain is increasing. There is reportedly no more room to cut costs. Now some
large NHS organisations, which have historically been considered to be financially stable
and effective at managing their resources, are in deficit (Nuffield Trust 2014b). This
approach to increasing efficiency is reported to have created a short-term focus. As the
Health Select Committee has commented in several reports, the NHS has been over-
reliant on the one-off effects of pay restraint and administrative cost savings and on
reductions in the tariff payments to hospitals for the care they provide. Progress on more
fundamental change has been slower than planned (Charlesworth 2015).
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While there is considerable media attention devoted to the health service being in crisis, a
review of the UK in international context shows that spending is about average. Figure 2
shows healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP for selected OECD countries.
Figure 2: Healthcare Spending as % GDP
Source: Kings Fund 2015
The UK is not far from the OECD average with about 9% of GDP spent on health, although
the proportion of private spending on healthcare in the UK is below average at 1.5% of
GDP compared with an OECD average of 2.6%. Note that the USA is something of an
outlier with much higher spending per capita and that this is not just from private finance.
Even with high levels of private spending, public spending per capita in the USA is higher
than in some other OECD countries.
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Figure 3: Life expectancy and health care spending: OECD countries (2008)
OECD 2008
Figure 3 shows that greater expenditure on health per capita is associated with longer life
expectancy. GBR is roughly in the middle of OECD countries on these scales. The USA is
again an outlier here with much higher spending and lower health outcomes in terms of
life expectancy.
This, then, sets the context for financialisation in England. The sector is under financial
pressure with a narrative that universal healthcare is “unaffordable” and reforms have
been recently introduced focusing on privatisation and competition with a view to making
the sector more efficient. However, the performance of the sector is in line with average
OECD spending and performance. The extreme challenges currently facing the sector
have only emerged since the last parliament and are largely due to the tighter budgets
from central government. Yet this “crisis” looks set to bring about a radical
transformation in the system of provision of healthcare in England.
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4 From neoliberalisation to financialisation of the health system
The health sector is large and diverse. To properly understand the on-going processes
requires a system-wide review of the sector. Sector reforms are generating shifts in social
relations that need to be set in the wider context. This section considers the current and
potential ways that neoliberal policies in health are opening pathways for more
financialised structures in the provision of health. This section draws largely on Epstein’s
broader definition of financialisation as financial motives and practices have become
increasingly central to the way that the sector is organised. Four key “mechanisms” of
financialisation prevail in the NHS in England.9 While these are interlinked, each has
different implications for financialisation in the sector.
4.1 Internal “markets” and financial structures
Since the early 1990s, incremental reforms to the NHS have focused attention on finance,
with a price put on health treatments, even though providers were mostly state agents.
The 1991 NHS and Community Care Act introduced the “purchaser-provider split”. The
aim was to apply market principles in order to drive down costs and improve quality.
Services were commissioned by District Health Authorities as well as groups of fund-
holding GPs. At the same time, some hospitals and other providers such as mental health
services were established as separate legal entities as NHS trusts (NEF 2014).
This “purchaser-provider” principle has been refined over the years and was adjusted
further with the HSCA in 2012. The “purchasers” or commissioners of care now consist of
209 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) described as “clinically led statutory NHS
bodies made up of GP practices from the local area” (NHS Clinical Commissioners
9 Since 2013 the four countries of the UK have had separate health systems. Most of the following discussion
relates to NHS England.
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website).10 CCGs were established in April 2013 and took over from Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs). CCGs are responsible for about 60% of the NHS budget.
The “providers” of care are the NHS hospital and mental health and community trusts,
private providers, not for profit enterprises and social enterprises. There are currently 247
NHS organisations responsible for delivering and managing hospital and community
nursing care, ambulance and mental health services. NHS providers can be foundation
trusts (FTs) or NHS trusts (Lafond et al 2015).
From 2003, all NHS trusts could apply to become FTs. This meant that they would become
independent of the NHS, set up as public benefit corporations with an independent board
of directors. There are 152 FTs. They provide over half of all NHS hospital, mental health
and ambulance services. FTs have autonomy over decision-making and can decide, with
their governors and members, their own strategy and the way services are run. They can
borrow money, retain surpluses and decide on how to provide services.11 Under the HSCA,
the aim was for all hospital trusts to be FTs by 2014, although that has not been achieved
(NEF 2014).
The sector has three main regulatory agencies. Care standards are regulated by the Care
Quality Commission (CQC). NHS trusts (that are not FTs) are regulated by the NHS Trust
Development Authority (TDA), and Monitor oversees the financial and management
performance of FTs. One of the core activities of Monitor is the monitoring of the payment
system for FTs. Health providers are remunerated under a system known as “payment by
results” (PBR) which was introduced in 2004 to replace block contracts for hospital
funding. Under PBR, prices are fixed nationally for specific procedures.12 This does not
cover funds allocated to GPs, pharmacists, dentists and other providers of primary care
(Nuffield Trust 2014a). PBR covers the majority of acute healthcare in hospitals, and there
10 http://www.nhscc.org/ccgs/
11 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-foundation-trust-directory/nhs-foundation-trust-
directory#what-the-ratings-mean
12 This is an important part of the legislation under the HSCA - organisations do not compete for contracts on
the basis of price. Even the strongest supporters of marketization are aware that this may lead to quality
concerns.
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are national tariffs for admitted patient care, outpatient attendances, accident and
emergency and some outpatient procedures. While PBR is widely used in acute hospitals,
secondary care in mental and community health services continues to be financed with
block budgets (90% of community services and two-thirds of mental health care) (Nuffield
Trust 2012b).
Under PBR, prices are fixed for specific procedures. This is based on the diagnosis related
group (DRG) system used in the USA and elsewhere. PBR was introduced at the same time
as commissioning in the mid-2000s to support patient choice of provider to allow private
providers to compete for the provision of some elective contracts (Nuffield Trust 2014, and
see below). The objectives of PBR are, according to the Department of Health (DoH 2012,
p.9):
 To support patient choice so that the money can follow the patient to different types of
provider;
 To reward efficiency and quality by allowing providers to keep the difference if they can
provide the required standard of care at a lower cost than the average price;
 To reduce waiting times by paying providers for the volume of work done;
 To refocus discussions between commissioner and provider away from price towards
quality and innovation.
In practice, PBR is extremely complex. The PBR system starts with a clinician making
notes on the patient record and ends with the commissioner making a payment to the
patient’s health provider. There are numerous factors to be taken into account. For
example, the tariff for admitted patient care is set at “spell level” and a spell is the period
from admission to discharge within a single provider for a single patient. Whilst admitted,
a patient might see more than one consultant during a spell of care. These are called
“finished consultant episodes” (FCEs). The vast majority of patient spells have only one
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FCE. Some have two and a small number may have more. The distinction between spell
and FCE is important in the PBR process (DoH 2012).
There are around 26,000 codes used in the PBR process to describe specific diagnoses
and interventions (DoH 2012). To make the system more manageable, these are grouped
into Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) described as “standard groupings of clinically
similar treatments which use common levels of healthcare resource“13 and this grouping
process “allows tariffs to be set at a sensible and workable level” (DoH 2012). HRGs are
nationally determined “units of currencies” which are the unit of healthcare for which a
payment is made and includes different time periods from an outpatient visit to a stay in
hospital to a year of care.14 HRGs are derived from diagnosis and procedure and they are
intended to allow comparison of activity within and between different organisations. The
classification system is designed and refined by the National Casemix Office (NCO) using
the Casemix Grouper Software (NCO 2015). In 2014 there were more than 1,300 HRGs
included in the national tariff (Nuffield Trust 2014b), and the number has increased
substantially since 2003 (Nuffield Trust 2014a).
The introduction of PBR is associated with a statistically significant increase in the number
of planned and emergency admissions, a reduction in the length of hospital stay and an
increase in the proportion of day cases across most groups of patient providers and HRGs.
There has been no evidence of a reduction in quality of care. This is consistent with studies
across Europe into similar DRG-based payment systems in replacing block budgets
(Nuffield Trust 2014a; 2014b). However, providers may have an incentive to diagnose and
treat patients to maximise their income: “there are incentives to over-treat: a
phenomenon familiar in the USA and other health-case systems based on payment by
results (more accurately defined as payment by activity since money flows irrespective of
outcomes)”, cited in (NEF 2014 p.39).
13 “Introduction to Healthcare Resource Groups” www.hscic.gov.uk/hrg
14 “Introduction to Healthcare Resource Groups” www.hscic.gov.uk/hrg
23
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
The pricing schemes are highly complex and costly to administer. The system relies on the
quality of information provided on cost data as the basis for reimbursement, and there is
evidence of a wide range of practice in the way in which costs are allocated (Nuffield Trust
2014b). Overall, the evidence indicates that “case mix adjusted payment systems” might
lead to improvements in productivity and efficiency of providers of care and make the
individual procedures more cost efficient, but there is no clear evidence that the health
system as a whole is more efficient. PBR is intended to incentivise hospital activity but
there are suggestions that it might be better to focus on more collaborative approaches to
health (NHSCC 2014).
Tariffs are traditionally supposed to be based on the average actual cost of services
reported by the NHS but in practice various adjustments are made. Changes in 2010/11
brought in “best practice” tariffs so that pricing is based on best clinical practice rather
than average cost (Nuffield Trust 2014b). In addition the tariff received by the provider is
multiplied by a nationally determined “market forces factor” (MFF) which is unique to each
provider and reflects that it is more expensive to provide services in some parts of the
country than in others and there may be other adjustments to the tariff with regard to
length of stay in hospital and specialised services or “to support particular policy goals”
(DoH 2012, p.8).
In the current financial climate of fiscal austerity, PBR is used as a policy tool to push
acute hospitals to cut costs (Nuffield Trust 2014b). One of the reasons for the financial
deficit of the NHS is funding cuts (see above) and these are being achieved through the
PBR. Since 2011 the prices paid under PBR have fallen as part of the DoH’s strategy to
deliver efficiency savings of £15bn to £20bn in the five years to 2015. In 2010/11 the annual
uplift in prices was set at zero when the inflationary impact of hospital pay and prices was
expected to run at about 3.5%.
Prices are a growing source of tension in the NHS. In what was described as an
“unprecedented development” in January 2015, healthcare providers rejected the
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controversial 2015/16 tariff proposals.15 The main area of disagreement was the level of
payment to NHS providers for emergency admissions which had been set in 2010/11 at
30% of the regular tariff price. This pricing strategy effectively applied a financial penalty
to hospital emergency admissions in order to provide an incentive to reduce such
admissions (NHS Confederation 2015). Prices in the health sector, then, may be based on
cost but they are also a means of policy intervention.
With hospitals operating as independent financial entities they run the risk of financial
failure which has a significant impact on health services. In 2013 the South London
Healthcare NHS Trust (SLHNHST) became the first to be put into administration because
of poor financial performance as well as issues with care quality. The administrator of
SLHNHST indicated that private healthcare firms may end up managing parts of the Trust
or delivering some of its services.16 Part of the financial difficulties facing the Trust
stemmed from payments to the private sector for PFI contracts (see below). In its last year
of operation (2012/13), the Trust paid £27.2m in finance costs equivalent to about 6% of
operating costs. The trust had six PFI contracts and spent 16% of its income on all of its
PFI contracts (NHS 2013).
The internal market in the NHS has created a financialised structure even in interactions
between state agencies. Financial penalties are applied by the state to incentivise specific
practices. But these are state agents and providers have no monetary gain from the
financial performance of the trust. This is a system which treats NHS providers as private
profit makers and the result is often simply to reduce funding for services. The process of
creating a market for healthcare has proven to be complex and expensive. As with water,
tariff setting is subject to contestation in health even though the majority of the agents
involved are in the state sector. Even where financial transactions are between state
agents, there are now strict financial constraints as the experience of SLHNHST
15 “’Disarray’ as providers resoundingly reject 2015/16 tariff proposals” National Health Executive 29 January
2015.
16 “Eleven NHS foundation trusts have serious financial problems, MPs told” The Guardian, 18 September
2012
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demonstrates. While internal markets have so far been a matter of transactions largely
between state agents, creating a “market” structure with independent “buyers” and
“sellers” sets the stage for increasing the scope for bringing in other non-NHS providers
as the next section indicates.
4.2 NHS funding for non-NHS providers
The contracting of private services has long existed in the NHS. The Thatcher Government
of the 1980s introduced outsourcing of some non-clinical activities. The 2000s saw an
increase in the volume of procedures carried out by the private sector using NHS funding.
In 2000 the Labour government set up a “concordat” to allow privately-owned centres to
be contracted by the NHS to perform low risk common elective surgery and diagnostic
tests such as cataracts and hip replacements to reduce waiting times (NEF 2014). With the
introduction of “choice”, patients were allowed to choose the hospital they attended for
some surgical procedures. Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) were
introduced in private hospitals to provide routine treatments in order to increase choice
and to clear waiting lists (Arora 2013). From 2006 onwards the role of non-NHS providers
increased markedly. In the decade from 2003, £5bn of NHS resources were transferred
through ISTCs to for-profit companies such as Ramsay Health Care UK, Netcare and
Virgin Health (NEF 2014). NHS England’s spending on privately funded healthcare services
has more than quadrupled in real terms and, in 2011/12, nearly 20% of NHS expenditure
on hip and knee replacements was with private hospitals and clinics. This is in contrast
with the policy in Scotland and Wales where healthcare spending is channelled mainly to
NHS providers unless there are exceptional circumstances (CMA 2014).
The main area of spending on non-NHS providers has been in community and mental
health services. Between 2010/11 and 2012/13, PCT expenditure on NHS-provided
community services fell while spending on care provided by non-NHS providers increased
rapidly. One pound in every five spent by PCTs on community health services in 2012/13
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was spent on care provided by independent sector providers, an increase of 34 per cent in
one year alone. Similarly, funding for independent sector mental health service providers
increased by 15 per cent in real terms between 2011/12 and 21012/13 alone, while funding
for NHS-provided mental health services decreased by 1 per cent (Nuffield Trust 2014).
Table 1 shows that between 2010 and 2013 around 18% of community health spending by
PCTs was through private providers. For hospital services the proportion has stayed
relatively constant at just 3.6% (Nuffield Trust 2014).
Table 1: Proportion of PCT spending going to independent sector providers (%
total PCT spending)
Community
Health
Mental Health Hospital Services
2010/11 12 12 3.2
2011/12 14 12 3.7
2012/13 18 13 3.6
Source: Nuffield Trust 2014
For the past five years, private provision of NHS services has been relatively small but this
is expected to change rapidly in the wake of the 2012 HSCA. Evidence cited in The
Guardian indicates that in 2014 private firms won £3.54bn of £9.628bn worth of deals
awarded in England – a win rate of 36.8%.17 According to the British Medical Journal
(BMJ), private sector providers secured a third of the contracts to provide NHS clinical
services that were awarded in England after the HSCA came into force in April 2013.
Analysis of 3494 contracts awarded between April 2013 and August 2014 (disclosed under
17 “Far more NHS contracts going to private firms than ministers admit, figure show” The Guardian, 25 April
2015.
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requests made under freedom of information legislation) showed that in total non-NHS
providers (including private sector, voluntary sector and other providers) have secured
45% of contracts awarded since April 2013, 1149 contracts (33% of total) were to private
sector providers, 335 (10%) to voluntary and social enterprise and 100 (3%) to other types
of provider such as joint ventures and local authorities. 1910 (55%) of contracts were to
NHS providers (including NHS hospitals, community and mental health providers and
general practices (BMJ 2014). Some large contracts are now being awarded to private
firms. Of 13 contracts awarded in 2013 worth more than £100m, six went to private firms,
five to private consortia and just two to NHS providers.18
There are expectations that the new legislation will bring in rapid changes in health
provision. Evidence presented by the Centre for Health and the Public Interest shows that
the government introduced similar policies in social care provision in the 1990s and 2000s.
Under these reforms, local authorities were required to purchase care services from the
independent sector. The result was a rapid growth in private provision of state-funded
social care services. Similarly, funding to local authorities was restricted at a time of
increased need, forcing governments to generate “efficiencies” and a reduction in quality
was the result (CHPI 2013).
An increase in the proportion of privately provided, NHS-funded healthcare is likely to
have a wider impact on overall service provision and raises inherent contradictions in the
policy. First, there is evidence of cherry picking. Private providers opt to treat the most
straightforward cases to maximise profits leaving the state with the most difficult to serve.
Medical markets are heterogeneous because all patients are different. But private
operators can benefit from market segmentation, offering commercially rewarding
treatments and only treating the easiest patients (Woolhander and Himmelstein 2007).
Recent contracts have failed to be awarded where anticipated profitability is too low. In
18 “Far more NHS contracts going to private firms than ministers admit, figures show” The Guardian, 25 April
2015.
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June 2015, private companies failed to bid for a £687m contract to provide cancer care for
patients in Staffordshire because of the contract price.19
Second, the system itself is costly to administer. One estimate from the National Audit
Office (NAO) cited in NEF (2014 p.41) put the costs of implementing the HSCA at between
£2bn and £3bn. NEF cites further research that states that the old NHS block budget
system was relatively inexpensive to manage and administer. The purchaser-provider split
with private finance and national tariffs requires far more information and monitoring
which inevitably lead to higher transactions costs.
Third, there is little compelling evidence that competition for health providers leads to
better health outcomes (NEF 2014). Seriously ill people who are the major consumers of
health are not able to shop around, reduce their demand if suppliers raise their prices or
to accurately appraise quality. Evidence from the USA consistently finds that public
funding of private care yields poor results. Competition between public and private means
that private firms carve out profitable niches leaving a financially depleted public sector
responsible for unprofitable patients and service. Furthermore, “Matrices intended to link
payment to results instead reward entrepreneurs skilled in clever circumvention”
(Woolhander and Himmelstein 2007, p.1129).
Finally, the process of competitive tendering required under the HSCA is to be carried out
by commissioners who are selected for their clinical expertise, but often inexperienced in
implementing and monitoring private sector contracts. The 2012 Act brings CCGs, that are
mainly comprised of GPs and other clinicians such as nurses and consultants,20 into the
realm of contract and competition law. Under the HSCA, CCGs are required to promote the
rights of patients to make choices with respect to treatment and they are required not to
“engage in anti-competitive behaviour”. In selecting a provider the main procurement
routes open to the CCG are (NHS 2012):
19 “Private sector backs away from £687m NHS cancer deal” Financial Times 5 June 2015.
20 http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/nhsstructure.aspx
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 To open the service to AQP [Any Qualified Provider] and enable patients to choose
from these providers;
 Competitive tendering to appoint a specific provider, a specified number of
providers or collaboration of providers; or
 Appoint a specific provider or group of providers without competition (Single Tender
Action).
However, this last action is discouraged for the reason that: “The law in this regard is
complex and carries an inherent risk of challenge”. Even if there is reason to follow the
single tender option, it is regarded as good practice to put it out to tender so that there is
transparency with the selection of the provider (NHS 2012).
Thus, although CCGs are not always required to put services out to tender, they are
advised to do so by the NHS in order to protect themselves from legal challenges from
private providers. And such challenges are starting to emerge. The CEO of private
company, Ramsay Healthcare, has complained that CCGs in some parts of England are
urging GPs to refer patients to NHS hospitals rather than private providers, against the
terms of the HSCA which says commissioners are not allowed to discriminate against
certain types of providers. CCGs are reported to be doing this in an attempt to keep their
local trusts viable.21 Similarly, private company, Spire, has filed a complaint with Monitor
that the number of patients being referred to its Fylde Coast Hospital had fallen as a result
of actions by the CCGs which had the effect of directing patients away from Spire’s hospital
and towards Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Monitor 2015). In
August 2015, Monitor announced it was launching an investigation into the process by
which Barking and Dagenham and Redbridge, Havering and Waltham Forest CCGs
awarded a care contract to Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS
Trust following a complaint by Care UK.22
21 “CCGs ‘urging GPs to refer to NHS trusts’ against competition law” Pulse 5 September 2013.
22 “Monitor to investigate NHS contract setting” OnMedica 24 August 2015.
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The practice of outsourcing in health has been around for some time and does not
necessarily lead to financialisation. However recent reforms have substantially increased
the scope for private sector involvement. The commissioners of health services are now
required to engage with competition law and to observe the EU Procurement Directive.
Given the potential threat of a legal challenge, CCGs are expected to play safe and put
contracts out to tender. In addition, a wealth of support is emerging from financial and
legal advisers for whom the introduction of anti-competitive legislation into health
services is a potential business opportunity. For example, law firm, Hempsons, have
produced a guide titled “Cooperation and Competition: A Step Guide for Foundation Trusts
and NHS Trusts” which provides advice to protect against legal challenges. They make the
point that “Essentially Trusts need to protect themselves against any suggestion that they
acting anti-competitively and consider that competition-based complaints are unlikely to
come from patients but from other NHS service providers who feel aggrieved or
disadvantaged”. Thus, medical practice and clinical processes are increasingly framed in a
context of competition law.
4.3 Private income for NHS providers
Most hospital trusts earn some non-NHS income. This can be from various sources such
as car parking, education, rental of space as well as the provision of services to private
patients. The NHS is a significant provider of private healthcare. In 2012/13 the revenue
generated by NHS UK from the provision of privately funded healthcare came to about
£500m contributing about 8% of total private healthcare industry revenue. About 96% of
this is in England and the majority of this (53%) is in London. There are different policies in
the other countries of the UK, in Wales for example there are very few private patient units
(PPUs) (CMA 2014, p. 2-7).
This in itself does not necessarily constitute financialisation. The edges between public
and private activity in the NHS have long been blurred, for example with NHS doctors also
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treating private patients within NHS facilities. However, it is expected that the amount of
private income generated will increase substantially in the near future. Under the 2012
HSCA, the cap on the proportion of income that NHS hospitals could earn from private
patients was increased from 2% to 49%. Although this only came into effect in 2013, there
are reports of large increases in private patient income (ppi) in some hospitals (Table 2)
and it is reported that the leading PPUs are “gearing up for growth” (CMA 2014, p. 2-8).
There are two ways in which this is expected to increase the scope for financialisation.
First, state hospitals are likely to increase their financially oriented activities. Already,
public hospitals are marketing to private patients. For example, Moorfields Eye Hospital
NHS Foundation Trust has three commercial divisions - Moorfields Pharmaceuticals,
Moorfields Private and Moorfields Eye Hospital Dubai, looking to attract revenue from
overseas patients. The Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust has a number of non-NHS
income streams including research and development in the form of clinical trials and
private patient care (Foundation Trust Network 2014, p.4).
Table 2: Income from private patients in selected NHS trusts (£m)
2010/11 2013/14 % change
University College Hospital Trust 7.3 10.3 41.1
Royal Brompton Hospital Trust 24.3 33.6 38.3
Moorfields Eye Hospital 16.1 21.3 32.2
Papworth Hospital Trust 4.9 6.4 30.6
Royal Surrey County Hospital Trust 3.6 4.6 27.7
Chelsea and Westminster Hospital Trust 10.7 13.0 21.4
Source: The Guardian, 19 August 201423
23 “Income from private patients soars at NHS hospital trusts” The Guardian 19 August 2014.
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Second, private companies, some owned by private equity funds, are making inroads into
NHS structures by partnering with FT hospitals. In a report by the Competition and
Markets Authority, private health company Spire indicated that the removal of the private
patient cap under the HSCA had led a significant number of NHS trusts to explore
opportunities to generate additional private revenues including through PPUs. The
company expected the trend of NHS facilities seeking to expand their private patient
facilities to continue and “there would be significant opportunities for private operators to
partner with NHS trusts to operate PPUs in the future” (CMA 2014, p.11-64). Some
partnerships have been recently announced. For example, in July 2015 it was announced
that US investor, HCA International, was the final bidder left for a contract to build and run
a new private patient unit (PPU) for the Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital NHS Trust,
the largest orthopaedic hospital in the UK. Spire Healthcare was awarded the contract to
manage and operate the existing RNOH PPU in 2012.24 HCA has also partnered with the
local NHS Trust in Manchester to construct the PPU known as the Christie Clinic. For the
hospital, the deal was expected to treble its private income (rising from £10m to £30m)
within a decade. 25 In 2011 HCA was named as the preferred bidder for Guys & St Thomas’
to fit out and run a PPU at the Trust’s proposed new cancer treatment centre. The contract
is for a 25-year lease. According to press coverage, this is one of several cases where
hospitals were entering into agreements in anticipation of the raising of the financing
threshold in the 2012 HSCA.26
In Sussex, a new contractual framework has been established between Sussex
Partnership NHS Foundation Trust and private equity-owned company, Care UK, to
establish a joint company to buy, build and manage mental healthcare hospitals. Called
the Recovery and Rehabilitation partnership, the company is building a residential home
for patients with mental health issues in Horsham, West Sussex, and has bought a 32-bed
mental health hospital in Gosport, Hampshire, opened in 2012. Any profits made by the
24 “Exclusive: HCA is final bidder standing to run new RNOH PPU” HealthInvestor 20 July 2015
25 “NHS trusts bid to attract more private patients” The Guardian 1 August 2010
26 “HCA the preferred bidder for Guy’s & St Thomas’ PPU” HealthInvestor 29 February 2012
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50/50 joint venture– mostly earned from fees for NHS patients – will either be split equally
or invested back into the company.27
There has, then, been a marked increase in joint undertakings with NHS and private
investors. The removal of the PPU cap has been presented as a way of bringing additional
revenue to the NHS at a time when funding is desperately needed. For the Foundation
Trust Network (FTN), treating private patients brings in funds to subsidise their NHS work:
The importance of non-NHS income streams also need to be considered alongside
the immense financial pressures facing foundation trusts and trusts – the provider
sector is already in net deficit and a quarter of NHS trusts and a third of acute
trusts were in deficit at the end of the financial year. With NHS income squeezed
and, at times erratic, given changing tariffs, efficiency requirements and non
recurrent funding, the availability of non-NHS income can provide a stable and
continuous income stream (Foundation Trust Network 2014, p.4).
Similarly, it was reported on the Manchester partnership with HCA, that initially staff
expressed doubts about the scheme until they realised half the income went back into the
NHS. Instead of detracting from the NHS, this deal is seen as beneficial. According to a
spokesperson from Christie Hospital: “I am only half joking when I say we are the new
Robin Hoods, taking from the rich to pay for the poor”.28
For investors, partnering with an NHS trust is an attractive investment opportunity, as
capital outlay and risk exposure are lower than those associated with establishing a
private hospital from scratch. Typically, there are considerable entry barriers to setting up
a private hospital. However, partnering the NHS in a PPU is seen as a “low-risk means of
market entry for private hospital operators” (CMA 2014, p. 11-58). Furthermore, long-
established, prestigious NHS hospitals offer an attractive “brand” for marketing to private
patients. Part of the attraction of being treated as a private patient in an NHS hospital is
that there is the full range of NHS general and specialist medical services on site 24 hours
27 “Care UK in joint deal with NHS” Financial Times 10 March 2013
28 “NHS trusts bid to attract more private patients” The Guardian 1 August 2010
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a day. Thus, publicly funded healthcare provides a safety net that is attractive to private
patients.
Supporters claim that income from private patients subsidises the NHS. However, there is
little evidence of this in practice, and subsidies could flow from the NHS to private
investors when the wider systemic aspects of provision are taken into account (for
example through the use of NHS-trained staff, NHS emergency back up and use of NHS
treatment facilities). More research is needed to understand the way that these
partnerships between NHS and private investors operate in practice. In particular, analysis
of the contractual terms and financial flows could shed light on the extent to which public
funds are interlinked with those of private equity and how this is expected to evolve as the
projects develop.
4.4 Private Finance Initiative
The private finance initiative (PFI) is the way in which the global trend of Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs) has been adopted in the UK. Since 1992 most new capital investment
in the NHS has been undertaken through PFI schemes where the private sector finances
the design, build and operation of hospitals and these are then leased back to the NHS
Trust over a period of decades. By 2012 the Department of Health had more PFI schemes
in place than any other government department – 118 in all with a capital value of £11.6bn
(NEF 2014). Most PFI investments have been highly geared with 90% funding from debt
(Vecchi Hellowell and Gatti 2014). This is the way in which financialisation is most directly
established in the provision of health in England.
PFI financing arrangements were politically attractive because they allowed for the
construction of infrastructure without appearing to use government funding. Their use
was advanced considerably by the Labour Government from 1997 to 2010.29 For NHS
providers, there was little alternative source of funds. Financing infrastructure in this way
29 “Gordon Brown’s poisoned PFI legacy” The Telegraph 24 January 2011
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has, however, been extremely costly, creating extensive liabilities for NHS trusts and has
been likened to making purchases with a credit card, in the sense that present
consumption is financed by lengthy expensive repayment schedules. For a detailed
critique of PPPs and infrastructure finance see Bayliss and van Waeyenberge (2015).
While the financing costs of PFI contracts are a small part of NHS spending (less than one
percent overall) they have increased rapidly since 2009 and are a large financing cost for
some NHS and Foundation Trusts (Nuffield Trust 2013). PFI payments are contributing to
financial deficits not just because of the capital commitments but the inflexibility of the
contracts (NAO 2014). The NHS was targeted to make efficiency savings of £20 billion by
2014-15, while at the same time repayments for NHS PFI were expected to reach £4.18
billion. In evidence to the British Parliamentary Review, the British Medical Association
indicated that fixed PFI payments would mean that efficiency savings would be more
difficult to achieve and health care cuts would be needed in order to meet PFI repayments
(House of Commons 2011, paragraph 55).
There are number of trusts that have been struggling with PFI payments. In 2012 the
South London Healthcare NHS Trust was dissolved in part due to financial problems
relating to two big PFI projects dating back to 1996 (Hellowell 2015). Peterborough and
Stamford NHS Foundation Trust has been crippled by PFI debts, paying around £42m a
year to service PFI debts, the highest in the country and over 20% of its budget.30 The
anticipated cost of the project comes to around £2bn over the 33-year life of the scheme,
nearly seven times the £289m original capital value of the new hospital. Millions of pounds
have been spent on management consultancy fees in the past five years as the Trust
attempted to come up with a financially sustainable solution.31 A report on the impact of
PFI contracts on NHS services in London found that the PFI schemes in the capital cost
£2.7bn to build but will require payments totalling £20.2bn from the fifteen NHS trusts
30 “Peterborough Hospital the NHS and Britain’s privatization racket” Open Democracy 19 September 2013
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ournhs/caroline-molloy/peterborough-hospital-nhs-and-britains-
privatisation-racket accessed 20 August 2015
31http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/616727e8-be38-11e3-961f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FSVyuxW0
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involved in the contracts. Two trusts are spending more than 10% of their income on PFIs
(NHS Support Federation 2015). The high costs have prompted the London 2016 mayoral
candidate to propose to buy out the PFI debts of London hospitals.32
Ownership stakes in PFI contracts are traded. Private contractors set up PFI contracts and
then on-sell the contracts for a profit. Even where the NHS trusts have had to receive
bailout funds to meet PFI payments, PFI shares are traded (or “flipped”) at a profit. The
South London Healthcare NHS Trust which was put into administration in 2012 had four
sales of equity in its PFI contract (Whitfield 2012, p.43). When the Trust was dissolved, the
Department of Health paid for the outstanding costs on the PFI buildings.33 In 2012 it was
reported that PPP equity had been sold in nine other NHS trusts that were reported to be
in financial difficulties (Whitfield 2012).
In October 2014, one NHS Trust became the first to buy out its PFI contract. The Hexham
General Hospital was opened in 2003. It was built for a cost of £51m but, under the terms
of the PFI contract which included maintenance for 32 years, the cost would have risen to
£249.1m by the time the debt expired in 2033. Northumbria Healthcare Foundation Trust
borrowed £114m from the local council to pay off the PFI contractors for the Hexham
hospital and this will save the Trust £3.5m a year over the next 19 years. Several NHS
trusts are in financial difficulties in part because of PFI payments. However, it is unclear
the extent to which the Hexham cancellation can be replicated elsewhere. This was only
possible because of the willingness and ability of the local county council to raise the
finance. In addition, some PFI contracts contain large liabilities for interest rate swaps
that may raise insurmountable challenges in raising funds to buy them out. Furthermore,
the Northumbria PFI contract contained a clause that allowed an early exit which most
others do not.34
32 “Mayoral candidate Sadiq Khan proposed buying up London hospital’ PFI debt” The Guardian 20 August
2015.
33 “South London Healthcare NHS Trust to be dissolved by October 2013” Department of Health Press
Release 31 January 2013
34 “NHS trust becomes first to buy out its PFI contract” Financial Times 1 October 2014.
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The government is planning to continue to use private financiers for infrastructure with
the adoption of PF2 although the aim is to rely less on commercial banks and attract more
funds from alternative financial institutions such as pension funds and insurance
companies. There is no indication that further privately financed infrastructure will offer
any better outcomes for health services and many of the underlying issues with private
financing of infrastructure will remain (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge 2015). The
experience of PFI in the provision of health demonstrates that politically expedient
measures to increase private investment in a cash-strapped health sector can lead to
extensive and problematic long-term liabilities. Furthermore, the financial sector comes
out of the PFI model relatively unscathed with contractual payments continuing to be met
while hospitals are forced to cut back on employment and other costs, demonstrating its
political and economic power compared with other agents in the sector, notably, labour.
5 The investors
So far the extent of entry of private capital into the provision of health has been limited
(Table 1) although this is expected to increase rapidly under the 2012 HSCA. As mentioned
above, the areas of the healthcare system where private sector involvement was most
extensive before the HSCA were in mental and community health services. Experiences in
these sectors provide insights into financialisation practices by health companies. In social
care, private equity investors have made substantial inroads in the provision of care
homes. Here, financialisation had disastrous results in one case. The Southern Cross
Healthcare Group was bought by private equity firm, Blackstone, in 2004, which then
implemented a “sale-and-leaseback” operation. Under this, the care home properties
were sold to a separate company, NHP, which was also owned by Blackstone. These were
leased back by Southern Cross which was the operating company, all under the ownership
of Blackstone. Blackstone then sold NHP for £1.1bn to a fund backed by the Qatar
Investment Authority. At this point the 2008 financial crisis led to falling occupancy rates
and a freeze in council payments. Southern Cross could no longer afford the lease
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payments to NHP. In addition, the CQC reported poor care standards.35 Southern Cross
closed in October 2011. In an enquiry, the company’s financial structure was linked to poor
care and ultimately the deaths of five residents: "The end result of what happened with
Southern Cross Healthcare was that its financial strategy and inadequate focus on care by
its responsible managers put vulnerable people at risk".36
Similar sale-and-leaseback operations have been adopted by other healthcare providers.
Care UK, described by Corporate Watch as the largest private provider of NHS services,
was taken over by the private equity group, Bridgepoint Europe, in 2010. Other investments
owned by Bridgepoint include Zizzi Italian restaurants, Fat Face, Leeds Airport and Pret a
Manger.37 Bridgepoint operate similarly to Blackstone. When they bought Care UK they
immediately created another company, Silver Sea Holdings, to build and own care homes
which Care UK will rent from them. The sale and leaseback model was also adopted by
Spire Healthcare, the second largest private hospital operator in England. Spire was
formed from the sale of BUPA Hospitals to the private equity company, Cinven, in 2007.
The company was then listed on the LSE and Cinven had a 38% stake.38 In 2013, Standard
Chartered closed a five year £400m senior loan to finance the sale and leaseback of a
portfolio of 12 Spire Healthcare hospitals in a £750m transaction. The hospitals were sold
to Employees Provident Fund, a Malaysian pension fund that also owns Battersea Power
Station. Standard Chartered provided a five-year loan for this. Part of the reason for their
comfort with the credit risk is that Spire Healthcare is operating “in a virtually recession-
proof industry driven by the country’s ageing demographics and the enduring squeeze on
NHS resources causing demand to rise year on year”.39
Other private equity investors are present in mental health service provision in England.
The Priory is one of the largest private providers of NHS mental health services, with 85%
35 “Southern Cross’s incurably flawed business model let down the vulnerable” The Observer, 16 July 2011.
36 “Financial strategy of Southern Cross homes blamed for old people’s deaths” The Guardian 9 June 2014.
37 http://www.bridgepoint.eu/en/investment-portfolio/?&page=9
38 “Market Report: Shares sell off by private equity group Cinven sickens Spire Healthcare”
thisismoney.co.uk 15 April 2015
39 “Standard Chartered finances Spire sale-and-leaseback with £400m loan” CoStar Finance 18 January 2013
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of the company’s revenue funded by the NHS and public sector organisations. In January
2011, The Priory was bought by US private equity group, Advent International, from Royal
Bank of Scotland for £900m with around £600m of the purchase financed through debt40
with a £600m high-yield bond.41 The Advent International investment portfolio is extensive
and diverse including supermarkets in Poland and hospitals in India. In the UK,
investments include insurance and credit card services as well as DFS, described as “the
UK’s leading sofa retailer”.42
Other private equity owned companies receiving NHS funding include Partnerships in Care
(PiC), founded in 1977 with annual revenues of more than £170m, mainly from the NHS for
specialist hospitals dealing with mental health issues, learning disabilities and substance
abuse. PiC was sold by Cinven to Acadia Healthcare Co Inc in the USA for about £394m in
June 2014.43 As a result of the deal, Acadia’s shares rose as much as 15% on the Nasdaq
when the takeover was announced. Acadia which is based in Franklin Tennessee said the
deal would add 17-20 cents per share to its earnings in 2014 and 40-46% per share in
2015.44
Private finance is also involved in NHS staffing. In 2014, TowerBrook Capital Partners LP
“a leading international investment management firm” took over Independent Clinical
Services (ICS) from the private equity fund manager, Blackstone. ICS (which trades as
Thornbury Nursing Services45) is a healthcare employment agency providing staff for NHS
trusts, CCGs, local authorities and prisons as well as the private sector. The acquisition
was expected to be profitable as it was made “at a time of strong market dynamics for
healthcare staffing services in the UK driven by the need to improve efficiency of service
40 “Priory hospital owners, Advent International, looking to ‘consolidate”” The Guardian 1 November 2011.
41 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/53f0b960-22d9-11e0-ad0b-00144feab49a.html#axzz3EmxPWhK3
42 http://www.adventinternational.com/investments/
43 “Acadia Healthcare to buy UK’s Partnerships in Care for $660m” Reuters, 3 June 2014.
44 “Acadia Healthcare to buy UK’s Partnerships in Care for $660m” Reuters, 3 June 2014.
45 http://www.thornbury-nursing.com
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and the continuing emphasis on enhancing quality of patient care at ward level and
throughout the NHS”.46
Other companies involved in health provision tend to be health companies from overseas
where private provision is more entrenched. For example the Hospital Corporation of
America (HCA) is gaining ground in the sector, particularly through partnerships for PPUs
with NHS hospitals through its subsidiary HCA NHS Ventures. HCA is the largest for-profit
hospital chain in the USA, bought in a leveraged buyout by three private equity firms in
2006 and then launched on the stock exchange in an IPO in 2011 which generated around
$1bn for the owners.47
Meanwhile, Ramsay Healthcare, which earns a large proportion of its revenue from NHS
elective surgery admissions, is listed on the Australian stock exchange. In addition, with
the expansion of contracts under HSCA, there are more opportunities for large UK
companies to diversify into health, such as Virgin Care which bought Assura Medical with a
£4m loan in 2010. In 2013 Virgin Care took over the provision of Child and Adolescent
Mental Health in Devon in a £130m contract beating competition from two rival bidders.48
In April 2016, Wiltshire child health services were transferred from the NHS to Virgin Care
under a five-year, £64m contract.49
As more private companies are entering the sector, the provision of health is being
transformed from a local community service to a segment of global investment portfolios
of international private finance. This is likely to have implications for organised labour with
employees transferring from the NHS to the contractor (although more research is
needed to understand the details of this dynamic). Company share prices are affected by
government decisions on the health budget. In addition, companies can be expected to
46 “TowerBrook Capital Partners LP agrees to acquire Independent Clinical Services” TowerBrook Press
Release 9 June 2014.
47 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-04/hca-returning-three-times-
cost-shows-timing-the-market-trumps-overhauls.html
48 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/jul/12/virgin-care-children-nhs-devon
49 “Wiltshire child health services transferred from NHS to Virgin Care” The National Health Executive 11
November 2015
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engage in financial practices to maximise shareholder returns. For example, in common
with water companies, investors in health services have organised their corporate
structures to ensure that tax liabilities are minimised. Typically this involves large loans
from group companies that create high, tax deductible interest payments so that taxable
profit is eroded. Health companies operating this way are reported to include Partners in
Care, Independent Clinical Services, Priory Group, Acorn Care, Tunstall, Lifeways,
Healthcare at Home, Spire Healthcare and Care UK.50
6 Health and water
Financial structures, processes, motives and investors are becoming increasingly
entrenched in the provision of health in England. Even within state agencies, transactions
are mediated through finance and clinical commissioners are now required to observe
international procurement rules. The 2012 sector reforms pave the way for a substantial
increase in private sector involvement in the provision of healthcare. Based on the
experiences with the provision of water, with the entry of private enterprises, the sector
will continue to evolve. The financialisation that has occurred in water in England and
Wales was unimaginable at the time of privatisation in 1989. The first owners were large
numbers of individual shareholders and then initial de-listing led to water utilities being
taken over by infrastructure companies. It was only in the mid-2000s that more predatory
financial practices began to be applied with the increase in gearing levels supported by
Whole Business Securitisation.
For the health sector, privatisation is taking place in an arena where financialisation is
well-established in this country, and private equity firms are already operating on the
periphery of health provision. With financial owners in place, the use of financial activities
to maximise shareholder distributions takes priority over health outcomes. Rising
property values are also exploited as a source of revenue accumulation as shown in the
50 “Tax Special Investigation: Firms running NHS care services avoiding millions in tax” The Independent 21
October 2013
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sale and lease-back activities of care home providers. This financialisation process means
that health services are interpreted in terms of their potential for financial gain in a more
creative way than was the case twenty years ago. Attention is paid to revenue streams and
asset values as well as the potential for securitisation to enhance shareholder
distributions. This is in contrast to the 1980s where privatisation was seen as a way to
improve productive efficiency by bringing in private owners.
In many ways, the SoP for health in England is developing along similar lines to the
privatisation of water in the 1990s and 2000s. There is a strong emphasis on bringing in
competition where possible. The regulator sets prices and mediates between buyers and
sellers and intervenes on a selective basis. The state sets the parameters around which
investors can organise their operations to maximise their returns. In both sectors,
financial investors have established corporate structures to minimise tax liabilities.
Private companies in health and water services have close links with the state. In the
health sector, there are reports that the private companies involved in the provision of
services for the NHS have owners that are connected to the Conservative Party. Donors
and lobbyists are reported to have secured lucrative contracts (NEF 2014).
Another striking parallel in both sectors is that England is an outlier in the UK. For water,
Wales has been included in the privatisation model but, even within this, Welsh Water is
owned by a not-for-profit provider. Water in Scotland and Northern Ireland has never been
privatised. In health, Wales and Scotland have not retained the purchase-provider split.
They have not put services out to tender with private companies, and the provisions of the
HSCA relate only to England.
For investors, the provision of health services offers similar advantages to water
investments, with health services set to continue to be funded and so creating secure
returns. However, for investors, health is a more risky investment with two key risks being
that the government may not pay for services and that the costs may rise according to the
underlying health conditions of the patients. Part of the problems faced by the Southern
43
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
Cross nursing home model stemmed from government spending cuts after 2008 which led
to a reduction in local authority funding for care home admissions.51
Processes of neoliberalism have shaped both sectors, and narratives have been important
in this respect. In health, the framing of the financial position of hospital trusts in terms of
deficits, crisis, inefficiency and unaffordability – even though spending levels and
performance are consistent with OECD norms - paves the way for greater private sector
involvement. In water, the narrative is of a great increase in investment which is held back
by the non-payment of water bills by some consumers – even though those that do not pay
their bills are known to be the most socially deprived. Meanwhile, the large amounts paid
to directors, shareholders and financiers continue, unchallenged. In both water and
health, policy discourse underpins a greater emphasis on financialised outcomes.
7 Lessons for foresight
The SoP approach in this case demonstrates that financialisation is a sector-wide
phenomenon and analysis needs to look at the structures beyond the proximate
parameters set by legislation. The way in which the private sector is involved, and the
types of companies operating, varies across different parts of the health service.
Investment in hospital PFI contracts has provided relatively low risk long-term revenue
streams which have been securitised. Investments that involve property ownership have
allowed sale and lease back operations which have increased the scope for financial
profits. Corporate structures have been established where high interest payments on
inter-group loans lead to lower tax liabilities. These interventions, often by financial
companies, bring the state-funded health system into closer contact with systems of
financial extraction. Such operations create financialised relations which are not
necessarily present in, for example, concession contracts for the private provision of
health services or where NHS hospitals treat private patients. However. with greater
51 “Care home operator warns on profits” The Guardian 9 August 2010.
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private sector involvement in the provision of health, there is more scope for
financialisation in the future. The tightening of state funding for health has pushed
hospital trusts into deficit. Even long-standing trusts that have had no financial problems
are now unable to stay within their budgets. Within this context, hospitals are now allowed
to earn more private patient income. Into this arena comes the requirement to put
services out to tender. This combination of factors looks set to form a springboard for
rapid and extensive private sector involvement in the sector. This process has been set in
motion and the effects can be expected to continue in the medium term, even in the event
of a change in policy.
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn if the sector continues on its current
trajectory. First, the sector is currently on something of a knife-edge. Without more
funding, industry observers expect health outcomes to start to suffer. The current
government, committed to austerity policies is unlikely to reverse the sector’s fortunes.
However, the political fallout of a collapse in the NHS is potentially severe. Therefore we
can anticipate intermittent “bailout” financing as has been the case in 2014/15. The result
is that funding is not part of an overall strategy and the sentiment of inefficiency and
unaffordability of the NHS is perpetuated, while there is political mileage from presenting
health financing in terms of a “bailout”.
Second, the combination of tight budgets and the lifting of the cap on private patient
income is expected to lead to a substantial increase in the proportion of hospital revenue
generated from privately financed patients. This creates a transformation in social
relations and ultimately can be expected to create a two-tier health system, based on
ability to pay. While private and NHS patients may be treated separately, they are likely to
share access to more expensive treatment facilities. If privately-funded patients are
prioritised, conditions for NHS patients will deteriorate. One of the main barometers of the
health service is waiting times for appointments for both primary and secondary care.
45
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
Where these increase they present a greater burden on home care, the brunt of which is
primarily borne by female household members.
Third, more contracts issued by CCGs will be awarded to private sector providers. CCGs
are advised to use the tendering process to avoid litigation from private health companies.
What this means for NHS providers is unclear. For supporters of reform, this is expected
to drive efficiency. However, evidence from the USA indicates that it is more profitable for
firms to boost profits by exploiting loopholes or lobbying politicians than improving
efficiency or quality (Woolhander and Himmelstein 2007). Costs paid to financial and legal
advisers are expected to increase.
Fourth, although PFI contracts have been shown to present a major financial strain on the
health sector, their use is expected to continue under a revised programme known as PF2.
This is a modified version of PFI where the aim is to allocate greater risk to the private
sector by limiting debt financing of infrastructure projects to 80% of project finance,
thereby requiring a greater proportion of equity finance. This, however, is expected to
increase financing costs which will be passed through in the contract price and without
other sources of finance, “there remains a high risk that more unaffordable projects will
be entered into by NHS Trusts, further impacting on scarce NHS resources” (Hellowell
2014, p.5). Finally, labour rights are expected to be weakened with increasing private
provision, as employment structures become fragmented across different health
providers.
Private health providers tend to benefit from difficulties in the NHS. Rising NHS waiting
lists are good for private business, either with the NHS being forced to contract private
firms to lower waiting times or with patients seeking privately funded healthcare services.
Austerity is likely to present business opportunities for private healthcare providers. For
example, Spire Healthcare anticipates an increase in demand for their private health
services in light of the financial constraints emerging in the NHS: “The ability of the State
to fund increases in NHS provision will remain constrained. The demand gap will grow”
and, “The market will continue to grow, driven by economic and demographic growth, by
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the widening gap between healthcare demand and the country’s ability to pay for the NHS
to satisfy that demand.”52 In terms of foresight, private health providers clearly expect
demand for their services to increase. In many ways the UK health system seems to be
heading towards the commercialized approach to health management followed in the USA
with health commodified like other industries.53
The political climate seems unlikely to change for the duration of the current parliament
which will run until 2020. However, there may be greater resistance to financial reforms
as the pressures on the NHS start to have greater effect and the strain on households and
NHS staff increases. There are now numerous campaign groups centring on the damaging
effects of NHS reforms. Opposition ministers have voiced a desire to set up a fund to bail
out NHS trusts from PFI schemes.54 While this may go some way to mediating the impacts
of neoliberalisation of health provision, a far more radical approach is needed to begin to
reverse the policy process. And reversal is more difficult as the financial sector becomes
more entrenched in provision. As seen above, just one PFI contract has been bought out at
considerable cost, although this will generate long-term savings for the local NHS Trust.
In water the lack of protest at privatisation is striking in England. While campaign groups
call for renationalisation of rail and energy, little mention is made of water. This may be in
part because the complexities of ownership are too challenging and costly to unravel. For
example, in March 2014 the total debts of the Kemble Water Finance Group, which owns
Thames Water, came to over £10.5bn (next to an operating income for Thames Water of
just £23.6m in 2014) and incorporates numerous bond issues made by different group
companies, some located in the Cayman Islands and some with a maturity date as far off
as 2062.55 In the current economic climate there is unlikely to be any political appetite for
52
http://www.cinven.co.uk/mediacentre/portfolionews.aspx?mediaid=616http://www.spirehealthcare.com/Doc
uments/Corporate%20docs/Spire%202013%20Annual%20Report%20final.pdf
53 For example, management consultants, McKinsey, compare the provision of health care to a car rental
company (Carrus et al 2015)
54 “Labour must clean up the mess it made with PFI and save the health service” The Guardian comment –
Jeremy Corbyn, 26 August 2015
55 Kemble Water Finance Limited Investors Report for year ended 31 March 2014.
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devoting public funds to water re-nationalisation. As finance becomes more embedded in
the health sector, the risk also arises that policies will be difficult to reverse.
8 Conclusion
Applying the SoP approach to the financialisation of healthcare in England shows that the
system that is in place today is the result of historically-evolved and context-specific
pressures and practices. The financial crisis has been the catalyst for fiscal restraint in
health spending. This has been supplemented with legislation to extend the reach of the
private sector not just with contracts for services but also with more private patient
income allowed in NHS hospitals. Health provision is becoming immersed in financial
practices with CCGs wary of inadvertently falling foul of competition legislation.
Restructuring has in some areas created lucrative revenue streams for private companies,
often backed by private equity investors. The extent of private sector involvement is
expected to increase rapidly. Healthcare services are being transformed as funding
constraints create a discourse of unaffordability and inefficiency, providing a convenient
backdrop to the structural reforms. The result is expected to be a considerable deepening
in the cultures of individualisation and commodification associated with financialisation.
Contrary to media discourse, however, the healthcare system in England is no more
expensive than most other developed countries and considerably cheaper than the
American system, Even within the UK, the measures adopted in England take privatisation
much further than in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. There has been some
resistance to the policies adopted with some political movements and campaign groups
organising with a view to reversing the HSCA legislation. In the May 2015 election, the
opposition party campaigned on a pledge to repeal the Act and on 1st July 2015, the NHS
Reinstatement Bill was presented to the House of Commons by Caroline Lucas of the
Green Party supported by a cross party group of MPs.56
56 http://www.nhsbill2015.org/
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However, the current government shows little sign of modifying the Act and even if
changes were introduced, this would be too late to stop the momentum of the privatisation
already taking place. Once service provision has been transferred to the private sector,
policy changes become more complex and more challenging.
Some sectors have seen more vocal campaigns to overturn privatisation and to some
degree, by association, financialisation. For example, there is a campaign to renationalise
the railways in the UK. In water, there has been little protest and financialisation is
difficult to reverse. The impact and reach of financialisation, then, depends to some
degree on the way in which the financial sector is engaged in the sector. The divestiture of
the water sector and transfer of ownership to private investors is a more profound
transition than a fixed-term concession contract. However, with health sector contracts
increasingly put out to tender, this may lead to the effective dismantling of the NHS with
the state’s role reduced to one of commissioning private providers. As such, the ability of
the public sector to pose an effective alternative to private and financialised provision of
health will be considerably weakened.
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